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Abstract. In the last few years, leading-edge research from information systems, strate-
gic management, and economics have separately informed our understanding of plat-
forms and infrastructures in the digital age. Our motivation for undertaking this special
issue rests in the conviction that it is significant to discuss platforms and infrastructures
concomitantly, while enabling knowledge from diverse disciplines to cross-pollinate to
address critical, pressing policy challenges and inform strategic thinking across both social
and business spheres. In this editorial, we review key insights from the literature on digital
infrastructures and platforms, present emerging research themes, highlight the contri-
butions developed from each of the six articles in this special issue, and conclude with
suggestions for further research.
Open Access Statement: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike 4.0 International License. You are free to download this work and share with others for
any purpose, except commercially, if you distribute your contributions under the same license as the
original, and you must attribute this work as “Information Systems Research. Copyright © 2018 The
Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2018.0794, used under a Creative Commons Attribution
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/.”
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Introduction
In recent years, there has beenmounting interest in dig-
ital platforms. Some of the most valued companies—
including Alibaba, Amazon, Facebook, and Google—
are platform businesses with surprisingly short
histories. At the same time, many long-lived compa-
nies are consideringhowthey canadoptplatform think-
ing to improve performance. For instance, General Elec-
tric, the American multinational listed on the Dow
Jones Industrial Average some 120 years ago, has made
significant investments in platforms for the industrial
Internet of things. Indeed, areas such as oil produc-
tion, power generation, and heavymachinery are going
through so-called platformization.
We define digital platforms as a set of digital re-
sources—including services and content—that enable
value-creating interactions between external producers
and consumers (cf. Parker et al. 2016). We view such
platforms as distinct from product platforms, such as
those found in the automotive sector (Fisher et al. 1999).
The digital platform itself does not necessarily hold
physical assets in the form of infrastructure resources,
nor generate value through product sales. In models
such as Airbnb, the platform has little in common with
previous linear value-chain models of product devel-
opment. Rather, it fits a platform ecosystemmodel that
emphasizes core interactions between platform par-
ticipants, including consumers, producers, and third-
party actors (Jacobides et al. 2018). In other cases, such
as Apple’s MacOS, iOS, watchOS, and tvOS, digital
platforms enable the building of a powerful innovation
ecosystem.1 In both examples, platforms exhibit archi-
tectural and governance rules that seek to balance plat-
form control with the necessary incentives for platform
participants to engage with the platform and generate
value for one another (deReuver et al. 2017,Ghazawneh
andHenfridsson 2013, Parker et al. 2016, Tiwana 2015).
Digital platforms are created and cultivated on top
of digital infrastructures. We refer to digital infras-
tructure as the computing and network resources that
allow multiple stakeholders to orchestrate their ser-
vice and content needs. Examples of digital infrastruc-
tures are: The Internet (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010,
Monteiro 1998); data centers (Gandhi 2017); and open
standards such as IEEE 802.11, and USB (Hanseth
2000), as well as consumer devices such as smart-
phones and tablets. While consumer devices can be
considered “lightweight” infrastructures in compari-
son to the Internet, which is more “heavyweight” (cf.
Bygstad 2017), it should be noted that smartphones
are powerful computational and networking devices
serving as infrastructures once they scale to a critical
mass. For instance, consider the role of smartphones,
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the Internet, and geographical positioning technology
in making Uber possible.
The wide availability of digital technology has has-
tened digital innovation to be built on top of digital
infrastructures. Indeed, easy-to-access digital infras-
tructure is of vital importance to create and grow new
digital ventures. Just as platforms facilitate the connec-
tion between supply and demand (Baldwin and Clark
2000, Gawer 2014), digital infrastructures provide the
necessary computing and networking resources. Dig-
ital infrastructures, therefore, are distinct from other
types of infrastructures because of their ability to col-
lect, store, and make digital data available across a
number of systems and devices.
Our motivation for undertaking this Special Issue
rests in the conviction that it is significant to discuss
platforms and infrastructures concomitantly while
drawing from information systems, strategic manage-
ment, and economics research. Most prior research has
been developed in separate communities that rarely
engage each other’s work. Going forward, it would be
beneficial to cross-pollinate separate bodies of knowl-
edge to address critical, pressing policy challenges and
inform strategic thinking across both social and busi-
ness spheres. In the remainder of this paper, we set the
stage for such cross-pollination.
In this Special Issue we first review key insights from
the literature on digital infrastructures and platforms,
which has provided a foundation for much research in
this field. Then, we present new theoretical approaches
and themes. We highlight the contributions developed
in this Special issue and conclude with suggestions for
further research.
The Architecture and Governance of
Digital Infrastructures and Platforms
Digital technology architecture is of significant impor-
tance for platform businesses’ use of digital infrastruc-
ture. Compared to a traditional product architecture
(Ulrich 1995), digital technology invites a diﬀerent
business and organizing logic (Yoo et al. 2010). Specif-
ically, the layered architecture of digital technology
(Adomavicius et al. 2008) creates a powerful basis for
building platforms that span industrial boundaries.
So, while Volvo’s new car SPA2 platform oﬀers scope
within the confines of automaking, a digital infrastruc-
ture, such as TCP/IP, makes no distinction between the
content transmitted.3 In other words, a unified digi-
tal infrastructure oﬀers broad platforms scope across
industries, not merely within them.
The architecture of digital technology can also dic-
tate new forms of platform governance. Boundary re-
sources, such as APIs and metadata (Ghazawneh and
Henfridsson 2013, Eaton et al. 2015), along with the
decision rights of platform stakeholders (Tiwana et al.
2010) significantly influence the evolution of digital
platforms. Emerging in the aftermath of the gradual
decline of monopoly-driven infrastructures and their
privatization (see Graham and Marvin 2001, Sassen
2001), platformization benefited from the decentraliza-
tion of infrastructure governance and the unbundling
of its use. In turn, this encouraged the distributed
and collective innovation of new technologies and ser-
vices (see, e.g., Ciborra et al. 2000, Constantinides and
Barrett 2014, Tilson et al. 2010).
In this section, we first discuss digital architecture—
specifically, the layered,modular architecture (Yoo et al.
2010), and its power to fuel platforms on top of digital
infrastructures. We also discuss platform governance,
not least in terms of providing appropriate structures
and incentives for value-creation and balancing open-
ness and control amongdiﬀerent stakeholders (see, e.g.,
Tilson et al. 2010,Wareham et al. 2014).
Architecture
Platform architecture has certainly received increasing
attention recently (see, e.g., Parker et al. 2016, Thomas
et al. 2014). Tiwana et al. (2010, p. 677) define platform
architecture as the “conceptual blueprint that describes
how the ecosystem is partitioned into a relatively sta-
ble platform and a complementary set of modules that
are encouraged to vary, and the design rules binding
both.” In this regard, the notion of a platform ecosys-
tem rests firmly on the idea of modularity4 (Baldwin
and Clark 2000, Garud et al. 2003, Schilling 2000), mak-
ing a distinction between the platform core—consisting
of tightly coupled components—and loosely coupled
peripheral components (cf. Baldwin and Woodard
2009). The design rules (Baldwin andClark 2000)5 then,
serve as the means by which stakeholders in the plat-
form ecosystem can govern their relations with other
stakeholders.
In the digital age, however, viewing platform eco-
systems as purely modular systems misses out on
some unique properties of digital technology. While
it is useful to conceptualize the peripheral compo-
nents of the platform as complementary because they
provide functionality, services, or contents not oﬀered
by the platform core itself, it is also important to
remember that a digitally enabled complement is not
like the accessory to a power drill. While diamond
drill bits complement the drill with specific function-
ality for hard surfaces, digital complements, such as
Google Maps, are more versatile in their potential
functionality.
Additionally, digital complements are product-ag-
nostic (Yoo et al. 2010). That is, their functionality is
not predetermined. For example, when GoogleMaps is
embedded in a physical product like a Samsung phone,
it complements the platform core bymaking the phone
more useful or attractive. However, Google Maps is
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also a stand-alone service. It can simultaneously be
used in a variety of diﬀerent ways; bundled with a host
of heterogeneous devices such as desktop computers,
mobile phones, and cars, and also in a variety of appli-
cation settings such as Booking.com, Rightmove, and
TripAdvisor. As such, digitization renders the compo-
nents of an architecture product-agnostic (Yoo et al.
2010). Potentially, infinite opportunities exist for ser-
vices and components to be added onto the archi-
tecture in a generative fashion (Lyytinen et al. 2018,
Wareham et al. 2014, Zittrain 2006).
The modular architecture becomes layered once dig-
ital components are embedded into physical products,
extending product boundaries and organizational
structures. Consider how industries are converging—
moving from independent, to mutually competitive, to
overlapping structures (Messerschmitt and Szyperski
2003). This convergence creates unprecedented pros-
pects for companies to envelop others by oﬀering the
incumbent firm’s product functionality or service as
part of their own. In the automotive industry, for exam-
ple, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) can
consolidate the design and control of certain compo-
nents with multiple digital capabilities that were for-
merly dispersed among suppliers (Lee and Berente
2012, Svahn et al. 2017).
In contrast to non-digital infrastructures, digitization
feeds into the ability of an infrastructure to remove
any dependence on location for completing a pro-
cess. As a result, it stimulates distribution of exper-
tise across geographical and organizational bound-
aries (Dhanaraj and Parkhe 2006, Gupta et al. 2007).
Such location-independence is creating a vast digi-
tal economy that is on a trajectory to outgrow the
physical economy in a couple of decades (Brynjolfsson
and McAfee 2014). Moreover, business processes that
once occurred among human agents are now being
executed among self-organizing, intelligent machine
agents, constantly leaving and re-entering the phys-
ical world. The use of artificial intelligence and the
industrial Internet of things is increasingly digitizing
business processes. For example, Airbus is combining
data on aircraft production with a self-learning algo-
rithm that identifies patterns in production problems.
The systemmatches about 70% of seemingly unrelated
production disruptions to solutions used previously in
almost real time (Ransbotham et al. 2017). By breaking
free from geographical constraints, the digitization of
a product or service also vastly expands its potential
market by enabling entirely new business models.
All of these factors have generated an abundance
of data streams on consumer behavior, orders, sales,
business decisions, and location of physical and digital
objects. The ability to access and share this data allows
organizations to draw on in-depth, and often real-time,
data analytics that lead to smarter decisions (McAfee
et al. 2012). The unanticipated implication of such data
ubiquity is that it allows loosely coupled networks of
small firms to rival the production and service capabil-
ities of large firms by better coordinating distributed
resources and participants.
It is exactly on the basis of such increased digitiza-
tion and openness that platforms emerge. As the lay-
ered, modular architecture of a digital infrastructure,
a platform invites multiple external parties—such as
consumers, producers, and providers of services and
digital products, as well as third-party developers—
to participate in interactions and the creation of new
value. Consider, for example, how boundary resources,
such as APIs, metadata, and software development kits
(SDK) forApple iOS, Ford Sync, andGoogleMaps plat-
forms, facilitate the emergence of ecosystems based on
principles of the layered, modular architecture.
As software developers create new applications and
services to be traded on application marketplaces, they
attract consumers and advertisers who generates both
same-side and cross-side network eﬀects (Parker et al.
2016). Such openness promotes ecosystems based on
multiple and diverse value propositions, while also
serving excess rents for the platform host or owner
(Adner and Kapoor 2010, Boudreau 2010, Parker and
Van Alstyne 2005).
Yet, digitization and openness also mean that com-
ponents of the layered, modular architecture become
easier to copy, reverse-engineer, or break. Such (some-
times)hostile strategieshavemanifested invaried forms
including: building meta-platforms (Ghazawneh and
Henfridsson 2013), jail-breaking devices (Eaton et al.
2015), and initiating proprietary platforms through
open-source licensing (Pon et al. 2014). As explored by
Karhu, Gustafsson, and Lyytinen’s (2018) paper in this
Special Issue, Amazon’s proprietary Fire platform is
an exploitation, or “platform forking,” of the Android
Open-Source project’s core. Amazon not only copied
the code of Android’s technical core, but also exploits
Android’s suite of applications at the service and con-
tent layers in the form of complements.
These cases support the importance of new forms
of governance that would let platforms control inter-
actions between multiple stakeholders without jeopar-
dizing their incentives for value-creation. We turn to
governance next.
Governance
Tiwana (2013) broadly defines governance with re-
gards to who decides what. This encompasses three
facets: How decision rights are divided between the
platform owner and third-party developers; what
types of formal and informal control mechanisms are
used by the platform owner (e.g., gatekeeping, perfor-
mance metrics, processes that developers are expected
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to follow); and incentive structures. While the lay-
ered, modular “architecture can reduce structural com-
plexity, governance can reduce behavioral complexity”
(Tiwana 2013, p. 118).
A recognized challenge in developing platform gov-
ernance, however, is how “to establish governance me-
chanisms that appropriately bound participant behav-
ior without excessively constraining the desired level
of generativity” (Wareham et al. 2014, pp. 1195–1196).
Similarly, Yoo et al. (2012) note that “organizationsmust
be designed to manage the delicate balance between
generativity and control in the platform” (p. 1400), a
point alsomadebyothers (Eatonet al. 2015,Ghazawneh
and Henfridsson 2013, Tilson et al. 2010). Implement-
ing the controls necessary to achieve the dual goals of
being simultaneously “stable andevolvable” (Wareham
et al. 2014, p. 1196), is verymuch aligned to the layered,
modular architecture of digital infrastructures. This is
in contrast to centralized, command-and-control gover-
nance structures found in linear value chains and hier-
archical organizations. It’s important to reach the right
balance because governance determines whether digi-
tal innovation made possible by the layered, modular
architecture will be successfully leveraged (Boudreau
2010, Parker and Van Alstyne 2017, Rochet and Tirole
2003, Tiwana et al. 2010).
To start with, governance structures define the plat-
form- and app-based decision-making rights of plat-
form owners and app developers. These rights refer
to the authority and responsibility for making deci-
sions directly pertaining to the platform and/or the
apps (Tiwana 2013). Second, governance relates to
the various formal and informal control mechanisms
that ensure platform owners that app developers are
aligned with what is in the best interests of the
platform.
In other words, control mechanisms let platform
owners enforce rules that reward and punish behav-
ior, and establish best practices on the platform (Evans
and Schmalensee 2007). These controls can be infor-
mal or formal and may include tasks such as gatekeep-
ing, process, metrics, and relational control (Tiwana
2013). A platform’s boundary resources—such as SDKs
and APIs—are formal control mechanisms, granting
access to the platform hardware and operating sys-
tem to write complementary applications or services
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013). They form the
foundation for a platform’s technology-based gover-
nance over third-party developers.
Beyond technology-related issues, a platform’s gov-
ernance also includes incentive structures that influ-
ence the strategic behavior of stakeholders and the
monetary profits of the platform. Digital platforms
tend to engage in strategic actions and exert rules and
regulations over participants, that are “distorted away
from pure value creation in the ecosystem, and toward
actions that lead to higher platform profits” (Boudreau
and Hagiu 2009, p. 170). The platform owners’ pri-
orities, then, are to protect their own interests and
secure their competitive positions while also securing
the interests of producers and consumers who con-
tribute to value-creation on the platform. To this end,
a number of monetization strategies become impor-
tant, including transaction fees, access fees, fees for
enhanced access and enhanced curation, as well as
strategies for subsidizing one side while charging the
other (Parker et al. 2016). Clearly, conflict-of-interest
risks can arise in this process.
Other platforms incentivize users to directly compete
with developers (Gawer and Henderson 2007) or fold
third-party innovation into the platform (Parker and
Van Alstyne 2017) so that consumers obtain these func-
tionalities at no additional cost. A platform owner can
also restrict developers’ access for quality-assurance
purposes, an approach most commonly seen in the
video game industry. Expanding the number of devel-
opers on a platform can result in congestion and crowd-
ing (Boudreau 2012), and consumers’ search costs can
increase due to information asymmetry between con-
sumers and developers. To reduce these costs, plat-
forms might engage in centralized, “quality certifi-
cation” via developer pre-screening (Boudreau and
Hagiu 2009, Evans and Schmalensee 2007). Platforms
can choose to screen products and decide whether they
arequalified for release, apractice carriedouton the iOS
AppStorebyApple, SonyPlaystation, andSAP.Not sur-
prisingly, the inconsistency and lack of transparency of
this process has attracted criticism from the developer
community (Qiu et al. 2017).
Another practice is imposing restrictions on stake-
holder interactions. Direct interactions between pro-
ducers and consumers outside of the platform, can
harm the platform’s economic interests (Rochet and
Tirole 2003, 2006), motivating platforms to control
these forms of interactions. Restricted access is adopted
mostly by platforms that also function as market-
exchange owners. Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) show
that TopCoder, a platform for tournament-based soft-
ware outsourcing, prohibits interactions between pro-
ducers and consumers to ensure that software develop-
ment in the contest is a sequential and planned process.
The disincentive structures described above resem-
ble behavioral-control mechanisms, where “specific
rules and procedures are articulated, which, if fol-
lowed, will lead to desired outcomes” (Kirsch 1997,
p. 217). However, as Tiwana et al. (2010) suggest, dig-
ital platforms cannot be viewed through the lens of
the classical principal-agent relationship as assumed in
control theory. The “role of control mechanisms then,
is one of coordination rather than mitigating agency
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hazards, as control theorists widely assume” (Tiwana
et al. 2010, p. 680).
Additional research on collective action may be ne-
cessary to understand how governance and incen-
tive structures can be best implemented to coordi-
nate behavior across multiple platform stakeholders
and their distinct interests (Constantinides and Barrett
2014). The main challenge is that given the openness
and digitization of services and applications on plat-
forms, as well as the competitive nature of interactions,
it is diﬃcult to collectively agree on common gover-
nance and incentive structures. This challenge may be
addressed if governance is nested into a series of lay-
ers, in linewith the layered,modular architecture. Such
nesting would distribute responsibilities and incen-
tives across stakeholders, with each layer dealing with
similar types of issues but at a progressively larger
scale, and lesser level of detail (cf. McGinnis 1999,
Ostrom 1990).
The value of nesting can be seen in the hori-
zontal and vertical assurance problems that arise
from technological interdependence. In these cases
(cf. Adner and Kapoor 2010), governance is polycen-
tric and multi-layered—they may govern consumer-
consumer interactions versus producer-producer inter-
actions versus consumer-producer interactions versus
platform-producer, and so on. Each layer of interac-
tions is governed independently from others, as long as
its self-governance does not aﬀect other layers. In this
way, governance is nested to higher layers until a layer
is reached where all stakeholders with a substantive
interest in a collective-action problem are represented
adequately.
A number of value-based principles have been
proposed to achieve such polycentric governance
(Constantinides 2012), however, these still need to be
adapted to the layered, modular architecture on which
each platform operates. For example, the iOS platform
will require a significantly higher level of nesting than
the Uber platform. In fact, it has been argued that
governance principles and incentive structures, along
with relevant decision rights, must mirror the techni-
cal architecture of the platform (Tiwana 2013). We dis-
cuss the challenge of mirroring, as well as other themes
emerging from this Special Issue, in the next section.
Themes Emerging in the Special Issue and
Opportunities for New Research
We now describe five themes that emerged in the
Special Issue and place these into a broader context
of areas where further research might be produc-
tively pursued. We refer to these themes as: the new
mirroring hypothesis; platformization and infrastruc-
turing; competition and scaling of digital platforms;
blockchain as a new infrastructure and platform; and
online labor platforms.
Table 1 summarizes these themes with reference to
the phenomenon, relevance, existing work, and possi-
ble research questions.
The New Mirroring Hypothesis
In the 1960s, both computer science and organiza-
tional theory posited a hypothesis that the structure
of a product development organization must “mirror”
the architecture of the product it develops (Conway
1968, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Thompson 1967). The
explanation is that a specific architecture is thought to
imply a certain partitioning of product development
tasks. Therefore, it should also determine the optimal
structure of the corresponding product-development
organization. The previously cited concept of modu-
larity oﬀers a better understanding of the mirroring
hypothesis. Modularity aims to capture the degree to
which the elements in a system (whether a software
system or an organization) are partitioned into func-
tionally specialized modules, or business units. These
modules operate nearly independently and can be eas-
ily removed or replaced because they interact through
simple, standardized interfaces, in the case of soft-
ware systems (Baldwin and Clark 2000). Organiza-
tions, on the other hand, interact through standardized
exchanges (Schilling and Steensma 2001).
More recently, Colfer and Baldwin (2016) reviewed
142 empirical studies and found strong evidence of
the mirroring of technical architecture to organiza-
tional tasks. However, they also found that in “open,
collaborative projects” supported by new digital tech-
nologies, the mirroring hypothesis does not hold
true. This is because contributors work interdepen-
dently for limited periods of time without the need
to coordinate (e.g., crowdsourcing contests). Although,
Colfer and Baldwin (2016) primarily focus on open-
source software development projects, other types of
“open” interactions—similar to those found on digi-
tal platforms—show even stronger evidence that the
mirroring hypothesis does not hold true. Without such
mirroring, the long-held interdependence between
technology and organization tasks (Thompson 1967)
is put into question; coordination is now achieved in
diﬀerent ways.
Within organizations, the mirroring of technical de-
pendencies and organizational ties is an important
approach to organizational problem-solving that con-
serves scarce cognitive resources. People charged with
implementing complex projects or processes must
arrive at solutions that account for the technical con-
straints; that is, they must communicate with one
another and cooperate to solve problems where and
when they arise (Puranam et al. 2012). Across orga-
nizations, the absence of technical and organizational
ties might determine, or predict, the location of firm
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Table 1. Themes and Opportunities for Further Research
Theme Relevance Possible research questions
New mirroring hypothesis
The seminal mirroring hypothesis is
challenged by platform-enabled,
open interactions. Scholars can
investigate new forms of
relationships between
organizational structures and
technology architecture.
The mirroring of technical
dependencies and organizational
ties is an important approach to
organizational problem-solving
that conserves scarce, cognitive
resources. This is also important
for determining loose versus tight
coupling between system
components.
• How can new, value-creating interactions be
supported without being constrained by existing
organizational structures and technical
architectures?
• How can constantly changing boundaries be
governed?
• How does coordination happen on digital
platforms?
Platformization and infrastructuring
Infrastructures are undergoing a
process of platformization as
architectural and governance
control points are opened through
digitization. Platforms,
meanwhile, are undergoing a
process of infrastructuring by
expanding their reach and scope
into supply chain management.
This dual process of platformization
and infrastructuring builds on vast
networks of installed, existing
infrastructures and platforms,
respectively. As such, they avoid
the “bootstrap problem,” or the
“chicken-and-egg problem,”
achieving greater and faster
scaling. There are important policy
implications regarding
competition and data ownership.
• How do platforms and infrastructures scale on each
other?
• How does such scaling aﬀect innovation and
competition?
• What are the policy implications for the network
eﬀects generated through platformization
and infrastructuring?
Competition and scaling of digital
platforms
The nature of competitive strategy is
changing as businesses adopt
platform thinking. Scaling is a
particular area where platforms
lead to new ways of competing.
With the increasing number of
platform businesses and
traditional businesses seeking to
adopt platform thinking, it is vital
to understand the competitive
dynamics of the digital era. This
applies to platform owners as well
as complementors, such as
third-party developers, seeking
competitive ways to advance their
business.
• What is the strategic interplay between platform
owners and ecosystem actors over time?
• What are the competitive moves that platform
owners can use to design boundaries to
surrounding ecosystem actors?
• How can third-party developers advance their
businesses across multiple platforms?
Blockchain as a new infrastructure and
platform
Blockchains are capable of
performing trusted operations in a
decentralized infrastructure.
Through a consensus mechanism,
parties with the right to validate
new transactions can update the
blockchain and interact directly
with each other, anonymously, and
without the need for central
coordination.
Blockchain infrastructure holds the
promise of increased speed of
exchange, a reduced number of
intermediaries and associated
costs, improved security, digitized
assets, wider access to
disadvantaged groups (especially
in emerging economies), and
improved regulatory compliance.
• How can blockchain technology overcome existing
architectural and governance challenges in digital
platforms and infrastructures?
• How can blockchain-based digital platforms
transform existing value-creating interactions?
• How does blockchain technology address the
misaligned incentive structures and trust
currently faced by digital platforms?
• What are the policy implications for developing
“smart” blockchain contracts?
Online labor platforms
The shift from permanent
employment to need-based
outsourcing, and from local labor
markets to global online labor
platforms.
Online labor platforms have
implications for the sourcing and
delivery of services and products,
but also for capital decisions and
for the degree of labor
specialization needed.
• How does pricing for work done on an online labor
platform impact repeat engagements?
• How do value uncertainties about a task aﬀect
employers and freelancers on online
labor platforms?
• How does online monitoring aﬀect successful
matching of employers and freelancers on online
labor platforms?
• What are the training and development eﬀects of
online labor platforms for unemployed workers?
boundaries. It means that technical systemsmade up of
many discrete modules can be implemented by loosely
coupled organizations, i.e., separate firms, while sys-
temswithmany interdependencies require tighter cou-
pling, such as those found in a single firm (Baldwin
and Clark 2000).
Previous research on system integration (Brusoni
and Prencipe 2001, Ceci and Prencipe 2008, Davies
et al. 2007) also has challenged the mirroring hypoth-
esis. This research, which observed the design and
construction of complex technical systems involving
many firms, found that while the systems were modu-
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lar (and mirrored) with respect to technical dependen-
cies andmost tasks, the systems integrator had to inter-
actively coordinate and manage the entire network of
component suppliers. To fulfil this coordination role,
systems integrators needed capabilities that spanned
a wide range of technical fields (Parker and Anderson
2002). As a result, their knowledge extended well
beyond what was directly relevant to the tasks they
performed in-house.
This view also has been explored in academic re-
search on the strategic manipulation of firm bound-
aries by the surrounding “industry architecture”
(Jacobides 2006, Jacobides et al. 2006). Interestingly,
it was found that technologically dynamic industries
constantly change their technical dependencies and
organizational ties to create new institutional arrange-
ments (Amaral et al. 2011, Pisano and Teece 2007).
Technical architectures and organizational structures,
therefore, should be approached as a source of strate-
gic opportunity, and should be dynamically changed
over time.
Although research presented in this Special Issue
has not explicitly discussed the mirroring hypothesis,
there is evidence to show that value-creating inter-
actions between diﬀerent platform participants renew
opportunities for dynamically changing both organi-
zational structures and the technical architecture that
supports the former.
For instance, the research conducted by Lee, Ba,
Li, and Stallaert (2018) in this issue examines the
performance of crowdsourcing contests on Kaggle.
The authors show that despite the well-reported mer-
its of using open contests for research and develop-
ment tasks previously performed within internal busi-
ness units (Boudreau and Lakhani 2013), the perfor-
mance of these contests is very much dependent on
in-progress feedback to the contestants. Such feedback
may lead to “salience bias” among contestants—i.e.,
“to over-emphasize the feedback while overlooking
other important information that may be helpful for
them to achieve desirable outcomes.”
What is revealing about these findings is that al-
though open contests of the type found on crowd-
sourcing platforms allow an organization to break
free from existing organizational structures and techni-
cal architectures, platform owners need to implement
appropriate control mechanisms to align the behavior
of the online community with the platform’s objec-
tives. Although digital platforms enable an opening
of their structural boundaries—both organizationally
and technically—to support new value-creating inter-
actions, such boundary openings, need to be met with
appropriate governance structures.
Beyond the openness of interactions, the digitiza-
tion of platforms also challenges the mirroring hypoth-
esis. The research conducted by Rolland, Mathiassen,
and Rai (2018) in this Special Issue explores the digi-
tal options, including “the transformative capabilities
aﬀorded by digital platforms’ generative characteris-
tics.” They examine how a Swedishmedia organization
leverages those capabilities to further develop its use
of a platform. The digital options’ concept underscores
that organizations must continuously identify options
worthy of exploration and selectively realize those that
generate new value (Sandberg et al. 2014, Svahn et al.
2015).
Rolland, Mathiassen, and Rai also explore digital
debt; “an organization’s cumulative buildup of tech-
nical and informational obligations related to main-
tenance and evolvability of its platform and infras-
tructure” (Kruchten et al. 2012, Ramasubbu and
Kemerer 2016). Their research shows that the Swedish
media organization was constrained by this technical
build-up as it tried to align its organizational struc-
tures with a new digital platform. In the end, themedia
organization leveraged a number of digital options and
broke free from its existing “digital debt.” For instance,
in addition to integrating previously dispersed work
systems, the platform encouraged new application
development, while encouraging the extraction, tag-
ging, and transferring of unstructured data among
journalists and producers.
These findings are significant because they pro-
vide evidence that the mirroring hypothesis becomes
increasingly less relevant as the digital platform
evolves to provide more digital functions that tran-
scend existing organizational structures. Rolland,
Mathiassen, and Rai pay particular attention to the role
of the layered, modular architecture of platforms, as
well as their “digitality” in enabling organizations to
leverage digital options and manage digital debt for
new value-creation opportunities, without becoming
locked into legacy systems.
Further research can more explicitly examine how
digital infrastructures and platforms challenge themir-
roring hypothesis. Some relevant research questions
include: How can new value-creating interactions be sup-
ported without being constrained by existing organizational
structures and technical architectures￿ How can constantly
changing boundaries be governed￿ How does coordination
happen on digital platforms￿
Platformization and Infrastructuring
We have already discussed how infrastructures are un-
dergoing a process of platformization by opening their
architectural and governance control points through
digitization, as described in the study by Rolland,
Mathiassen, and Rai. At the same time, we are also
beginning to see the opposite happening: The infras-
tructuring of digital platforms by making them more
physical, while expanding their reach and scope.
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Amazon is a good example of this countereﬀect.
Amazon started oﬀ as an online retailer but grad-
ually moved toward a multi-sided platform model
that allows diﬀerent actors—buyers, sellers, and other
third parties, including advertisers, software develop-
ers, cloud providers, and so on—to interact on its plat-
form and create value for one another. Over time, it
has grown so much that it has increasingly taken over
a number of businesses with physical assets, while
getting involved in more traditional supply chains or
“pipeline businesses” (Parker et al. 2016). For exam-
ple, Amazon recently bought Whole Foods, a super-
market chain. Together with its Amazon Prime service
and AmazonFresh unit, and a logistics network to rival
those of FedEx andUPS,6 Amazon has developed capa-
bilities to deliver multiple items in the same order, on
the same day. A clear strategy is underway to move
into supply-chain management and distribution, while
expanding the company’s digital platform strategy.
The dual process of platformization and infras-
tructuring builds on the existing installed base of
infrastructures and platforms, respectively, avoiding
the “bootstrap problem” faced by early infrastructures
(Hanseth and Aanestad 2003, Hanseth and Lyytinen
2010), as well as the “chicken-and-egg problem” of
early digital platforms (Hagiu and Eisenmann 2007,
Parker et al. 2016). Instead, by taking advantage of
network eﬀects on the existing installed base, these
new infrastructures and platforms achieve greater and
faster scaling. There are also important policy impli-
cations around competition and data ownership given
the scale of these infrastructure-platforms (see Impli-
cations for Policy).
Fundamentally, platformization can be viewed as a
strategy for operating multisided platforms and con-
necting buyers and sellers without controlling or own-
ing the products or services being sold, as in the
examples of eBay, Airbnb, and others. In contrast,
infrastructuring can be viewed as a strategy for operat-
ing as a supermarket supply chain, acquiring and then
reselling products and services. Multisided platforms
have become very popular in recent years because they
are financially more attractive and less complex than
supply chains. Multisided platforms also have low
operating costs and high percentage margins because
they usually take a cut from each transaction, which
goes straight to the bottom line. On the other hand,
supply chains typically have higher revenue, but also
high capital investment in infrastructure—such as data
and product warehouses, and distribution—as well as
greater operating costs and lower percentage margins.
The two strategies can be viewed along a continuum,
as companies strive to acquire more control, while at
the same time pushing for more innovation. Scale and
aggregation eﬀects become very important in this con-
tinuum (Hagiu andWright 2013), as they help platform
owners determine when to engage in infrastructuring.
For example, high-demand products like supermar-
ket items are known to sell more eﬃciently by one
large reseller than by many small sellers. Also, some
products and services have much higher value to buy-
ers when bought together than when purchased sepa-
rately from independent sellers. In these cases, a plat-
form owner such as Amazon, may choose to become
a reseller to capitalize on economies of scale in infras-
tructure investments, while feeding into more innova-
tive products and services (Hagiu and Wright 2013).
Scale and aggregation eﬀects are also important for
building innovative complementarities between prod-
ucts and services.
For example, Apple engaged in both platformiza-
tion and infrastructuring in its iTunes-iPod combina-
tion when it used a typical razors-and-blades pricing
strategy given the scale and aggregation eﬀects. In con-
trast, when it comes to the Apple App store, Apple
does not engage in infrastructuring because gaining
control over thousands of developers, their pricing
strategies, end-user licensing, and customer support
would mean increasing costs for Apple. Instead, the
company kept to its multi-sided platform strategy.
Recent research has conceptualized the diﬀerences
between multisided platforms and reseller supply
chains in terms of “the allocation of control rights
between independent suppliers and the intermediary
over non-contractible decisions (prices, advertising,
customer service, responsibility for order fulfilment,
etc.) pertaining to the products being sold” (Hagiu and
Wright 2015, p. 3). In the case of multisided platforms,
all of these residual control rights rest with indepen-
dent suppliers (e.g., partner shops on Amazon and
eBay). In the case of reseller supply chains, all residual
control rights rest with the supply-chain coordinator,
such as Walmart.
Other literature streams have also contributed to a
better understanding of control and its relationship to
innovation. For example, research on vertical integra-
tion and the theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart
1986, Hart and Moore 1990) has focused on “make-
or-buy” decisions, with implications as to the level
of control a firm retains while seeking to build in-
house capabilities versus sourcing those from third
parties. These decisions may be relevant to infrastruc-
ture investments, however, for multisided platforms
the focal firm (platform owner) does not act as a con-
tractor, but merely as an enabler and facilitator. Conse-
quently, the trade-oﬀs for innovation are diﬀerent.
Research also has looked more broadly at deci-
sions around an organization’s design (Alonso et al.
2008, 2015), and the design of infrastructures (Hanseth
and Lyytinen 2010, Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013).
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This research captures the relationship between con-
trol and innovation, and change as implicated in dif-
ferent governance modes and architectural configura-
tions. Broadly speaking, centralized governance with
tightly coupled components may lead to more con-
trol, but that comes at the risk of impeding innova-
tive eﬀorts. In contrast, decentralized governance and
loosely coupled components may lead to more inno-
vation but less control and eventually, chaotic environ-
ments (Hanseth and Ciborra 2007).
All these streams have provided great insights on
how control can be achieved while accommodating in-
novation, but there is currently no research examin-
ing what happens when a company engages in both
platformization and infrastructuring, and has to con-
trol both demand-driven innovation (platforms), and
supply-driven innovation (infrastructures).
As discussed, and as noted elsewhere (Tilson et al.
2010, de Reuver et al. 2017), digital infrastructures and
platforms are now far less limited in the ways their
components can be recombined; one digital infrastruc-
ture can form a service foundation for other infras-
tructures, and even platforms. This digitization, cou-
pled with the powerful democratization of innovation
(Chesbrough 2006, VonHippel 2005, Zittrain 2006), has
had a disruptive eﬀect of redistributing control across
online participants and the applications they use to
interact and co-create value.
At the same time, however, as the examples of
Amazon and Alibaba show, a few companies now
dominate the construction and maintenance of global
digital infrastructures requiring prohibitive amounts
of financial and technological resources for market
entry (Eaton et al. 2015, Tilson et al. 2010). Smaller com-
panies cannot eﬀectively participate in innovative pro-
grams without such infrastructure being controlled by
a few powerful companies. Therefore, further research
needs to theoretically grapplewith the paradoxical ten-
sion of the generative and democratizing force of dig-
ital platforms and the monopolistic and controlling
force of digital infrastructures. That’s why they should
be studied concomitantly.
Some relevant research questions include: How do
platforms and infrastructures scale on each other￿ How does
such scaling aﬀect innovation and competition￿What are the
policy implications for the network eﬀects generated through
platformization and infrastructuring￿
Competition and Scaling of Digital Platforms
The idea of winner-take-all markets has dominated the
discussion on competitive strategy in the platform con-
text. This concept implies a sense of urgency to scale
quickly. Such urgency is grounded in the benefits of
positive network eﬀects, that is, the increased platform
value for all existing users generated by each new user
added (Katz and Shapiro 1986, Parker and Van Alstyne
2005). In markets where network eﬀects are strong,
there is simply little competitive space for more than
a few players. In addition, velocity in the early stages
of a technology’s life is fundamental for its future path
(Schilling 2002). Even with superior technology or per-
formance, it is diﬃcult to catch up to any platform
provider with early advantage. In nascent markets, this
creates strong incentives to grow the user base quickly
(Huang et al. 2017).
While traditional strategymodels, like the five-forces
model, still make sense in the platforms context (Porter
and Heppelmann 2014), it is fair to say that platforms
invite new forms of strategic thinking. The significance
of the platform’s core interaction (Parker et al. 2016),
and the related network eﬀects as it connects supply
and demand, changes some of the strategy fundamen-
tals. Consider how the size of the user base in the early
life of a digital venture has become as important as tra-
ditional measures such as revenue, market share, and
number of employees.
In view of the increasing number of platform busi-
nesses and those adopting platform thinking, it is
vital to better understand the competitive dynamics
of platforms. Much of the existing research deals with
competitive strategy for platform owners (see, e.g.,
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013, Tiwana et al. 2010).
Equally important, but less-often covered in the lit-
erature, is how complementors—such as third-party
developers—find ways to develop their businesses.
This might involve multi-homing, that is, participa-
tion across several platforms to extend the size of a
potential market. It might also encompass competitive
moves at the boundary between the platform core and
its complements.
Some of the strategic moves of platform owners in-
volve redrawing boundaries. Such boundary redefini-
tion often takes place in competition with other plat-
forms, but can also require redefining the boundary for
ecosystem actors, such as third-party developers. Plat-
form envelopment is an example of a strategy whereby
a platform uses its overlapping user base to overcome
entry barriers and expand its reach. Eisenmann et al.
(2011) describe platform envelopment as “entry by one
platform provider into another’s market by bundling
its own platform’s functionality with that of the tar-
get’s so as to leverage shared user relationships and
common components” (p. 1271).
Envelopment involves increasing the scope of the
platform and the platform owner can make similar
moves in relation to its ecosystem actors. For instance,
the paper by Foerderer, Kude, Mithas, and Heinzl
(2018) in this Special Issue, deals with the conse-
quences of platform entry for third-party developers
in the same market category. Studying Google Photos
and its entry on the Android platform, it deals with
the problem of entering complementary markets and
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the consequences for innovation, including the rents of
the complementors (see, e.g., Eaton et al. 2015, Tiwana
2015). Clearly, Google’s unanticipated decision to enter
the photography app market was challenging to estab-
lished third-party photography app developers in the
Android ecosystem. Should they increase innovation
as a response to the entry? Interestingly, the research
suggests that the spillover of consumer attention in the
photo-app category helped build a larger market, com-
pensating for the negative eﬀect of the platform entry
and supporting further innovation in the area.
However, platform complements also help in strate-
gizing. One of the most well-known strategies for plat-
form complements to expand their market is to multi-
home (see, e.g., Eisenmann et al. 2006). Multi-homing
refers to a platform complement’s participation inmul-
tiple platforms at the same time. In addition to increas-
ing the potential market, multi-homing is also pur-
sued to lower the risk associated with being dependent
on one platform ecosystem. The paper by Cennamo,
Ozalp, and Kretschmer (2018) adds to our understand-
ing of multi-homing. It highlights that complement
providers face trade-oﬀs when they seek to grow their
potential market through multi-homing. In particular,
complementors have to decide the extent to which the
complement should be specialized to each technical
platform. In a study of the U.S. video game industry,
the authors find that the quality of games released on
a focal platform drop on subsequent platform releases.
Forking is another example of a strategic move that
non-focal actors of a platform can make. Examining
forking in the context of the Android platform, Karhu,
Gustafsson, and Lyytinen’s Special Issue paper investi-
gates five cases of strategic exploitation where the hos-
tile firm exploits the shared-platform resources with-
out engaging with the platform owner’s controlling
boundary resources. They analyze a number of forking
strategies and the related platform responses involving
modification of the boundary resources (Ghazawneh
and Henfridsson 2013, Eaton et al. 2015) to mitigate the
exploitation.
Finally, the Special Issue paper by Niculescu, Wu,
and Xu (2018) deals with the strategic decision to open
a proprietary technology platform by analyzing the
interplay between same-side openness, the intensity of
the network eﬀects, and the absorptive capacity of the
entrant. Using a game-theoreticmodel, the study docu-
ments some interesting strategic outcomes. In particu-
lar, it shows the conditions under which the incumbent
would either close the technology or open it to entrants
possessing enough absorptive capacity.
There is a growing body of knowledge in the area
of platform competition and strategy, but there are
clearly many unanswered questions for future research
to address. Indicative research questions include:What
is the strategic interplay between platform owners and
ecosystem actors over time￿ What are the competitive moves
that platform owners can use to design boundaries to sur-
rounding ecosystem actors￿ How can third-party developers
advance their businesses across multiple platforms￿
Blockchain as a New Infrastructure and Platform
Blockchain, which first emerged as the technology
underpinning cryptocurrency trading, “is a distributed
ledger technology in the form of a distributed trans-
actional database, secured by cryptography, and gov-
erned by a consensus mechanism” (Beck et al. 2017,
p. 381). A blockchain can also include so-called “smart
contracts,” or modular components (similar to apps),
added onto the blockchain and run without any risk of
downtime, censorship, or fraud (Buterin 2014). Briefly,
when twoparties begin an interaction, such as a request
for data or a financial exchange, “the ledger automat-
ically creates a new transaction record composed of
blocks of data, each encrypted by altering (or “hash-
ing”) part of the previous block. The cryptographic
connection between each block and the next forms
one link of the chain” (Plansky et al. 2016). This pro-
cessmeans that committing a successful fraud becomes
almost impossible, because blocks of transactions are
continuously validated. “Records cannot be tampered
with, because altering them would require coordinat-
ingmany separate computers” (Plansky et al. 2016).
In contrast to a centralized infrastructure controlled
by a single party (e.g., a bank, an electricity provider,
a logistics provider, etc.), distributed ledgers enabled
with smart contracts can perform trusted operations
in a decentralized infrastructure. Through a consen-
sus mechanism, parties with the right to validate new
transactions can update the blockchain and interact
directlywith each other, anonymously, andwithout the
need for central coordination.
Blockchain infrastructure holds out great promise,
to increase the speed of exchange, reduce the num-
ber of intermediaries and associated costs, improve
security, digitize assets, give wider access to disadvan-
taged groups (especially in emerging economies), and
improve regulatory compliance (Tapscott and Tapscott
2016). It is also very disruptive. “Conventional digital
tools may improve the way things work, but they don’t
fundamentally alter the structure of infrastructure.
Blockchain, on the other hand, oﬀers infrastructure
leaders the opportunity to not only increase eﬃciency
and reduce costs, but evolve howphysical commodities
aredistributedandconsumed” (TaltonandTonar 2018).
Many companies are beginning to explore the devel-
opment of new payment and trading platforms for
energy, finance and banking, health, logistics and trans-
portation, and others. For instance, Grid+ (Consensys
2017) is developing a blockchain-based infrastructure
and platform that would allow users to buy and sell
electricity from diﬀerent energy producers using cryp-
tocurrencies, while intelligently managing smart loads
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(e.g., Tesla Powerwall, or Nest thermostat). Blockchain
technology has also been noticed by a consortium of
energy companies, includingBP,RoyalDutch Shell, Sta-
toil; trading houses Gunvor, Koch Supply & Trading,
andMercuria; and banks, such asABNAmro, ING, and
SocieteGenerale. Thismulti-sector consortiumwants to
develop a blockchain-based digital platform for energy
commodities trading.7
Examples from other sectors include a joint venture
between IBM and Maersk to provide “more eﬃcient
and secure methods” for global trade using blockchain
technology,8 and the Blockchain in Transport Alliance,9
that involves shipping giants UPS and FedEx, and aims
at setting industry standards for using blockchain to
track shipments, manage logistics, and replace freight
brokers.
Blockchain infrastructures and platforms are usually
complemented with cryptocurrencies. “Cryptocurren-
cies are digital assets designed to work as a medium
of exchange using cryptography to secure the transac-
tions, to control the creation of additional units, and to
verify the transfer of assets” (Montemayor et al. 2018,
p. 4). The currencies enable a blockchain infrastructure
to be truly peer-to-peer, while creating vast opportuni-
ties to disrupt established transaction networks.
Although the above examples indicate increas-
ing, large-scale developments in blockchain technolo-
gies in recent years, there has been “less academic
research . . . [on] the implications of blockchain for how
we organize contemporary economies, society or orga-
nizations” (Beck et al. 2017, p. 381). Extant research
focuses primarily on the technical design of blockchain
technology, informed largely by theoretical papers on
cryptocurrencies (Tschorsch and Scheuermann 2016).
This has led to a neglect of research on the managerial,
organizational, and economic impact of blockchain in
areas other than finance, including many of the topics
covered in this Special Issue.
A recent systematic review of the literature on
blockchain technology, its applications, design, use,
and implications across various disciplines, identified
three themes for further research (Risius and Spohrer
2017). The themes include:
• “Design and features,” which focuses on “decen-
tralized control and immutability of event logs, and the
applicability and potential of the technology” (Risius
and Spohrer 2017, p. 390);
• “Measurement and value,” which “addresses the
added value that blockchain produces for users and
industries under consideration of platforms and appli-
cations” (ibid., p. 394);
• “Management and organization,” which concerns
“questions surrounding the governance, use, eﬀects,
and overall organization of blockchain-based informa-
tion systems” (ibid., p. 396).
The authors provide a compelling read and identify
a number of research questions across these themes
and perspectives that future IS research could take
on. Regarding blockchain platforms, the authors raise
questions around the scalability, decentralization,mod-
ularity and interoperability, and governance challenges
faced by diﬀerent stakeholders, as well as new types of
value creation.
Beyond cryptocurrencies and the exchange of finan-
cial value, research questions are raised as to whether
blockchain can begin to support other types of value
creation including verification and enforcement of con-
tract agreements, validation of electoral votes, secure
transfer of private information and data, shipping and
logistics information, and much more. Many of these
questions rest on the assumption that blockchain is a
“trust machine” (The Economist 2015). Yet, some have
cautioned that trust cannot be replaced by algorithms
instead of institutions and market authorities (Lustig
and Nardi 2015) as well as the communities that gov-
ern blockchain agents’ interactions (Maurer et al. 2013).
To ensure a trust-less infrastructure in financial trans-
actions would require all financial agreements to be
cash-collateralized at 100%, which is very challenging
from a cost-of-capital perspective (Roubini and Byrne
2018). Still, the possibilities created by blockchain
should drive a re-examination of existing research on
trust on virtual teams and online digital transactions,
whether it is knowledge-based or swift trust (Crisp and
Jarvenpaa 2013, Robert et al. 2009).
Another important point concerns the ability of a
blockchain infrastructure and platform to scale. Block-
chains require that all transactions be verified cryp-
tographically, which slows them down because they
require a huge amount of energy. One recent report
has argued that Bitcoin “mining” operations in Iceland
consume more energy than all Icelandic households
combined (see Roubini and Byrne 2018). In a platform
context, since not all users have the same hardware,
Bitcoin transactions may get slower and more expen-
sive in energy consumption. At the moment, Bitcoin
Core, the Bitcoin software client, processes only five
to seven transactions per second, compared to Visa,
which processes 25,000 transactions per second. Scal-
ing blockchain infrastructures and platforms appears
to be seriously challenged.
Further research into blockchain will need to con-
sider both the underlying digital infrastructure and
the emerging digital platforms. Some relevant research
questions include: How can blockchain technology over-
come existing architectural and governance challenges in
digital platforms and infrastructures￿ How can blockchain-
based digital platforms transform existing value-creating
interactions￿ How does blockchain technology address mis-
aligned incentive structures and trust currently faced by
digital platforms￿What are the policy implications for devel-
oping “smart” blockchain contracts￿
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Online Labor Platforms
In recent years, new digital technologies have facili-
tated the shift from permanent employment to need-
based outsourcing, and from local labor markets to
global, online labor platforms (Chen and Horton
2016). The online labor industry, dominated by three
major platforms—Upwork, Freelancer, and Zhubajie/
Witmart—was estimated to account for $1.9 billion in
gross service revenue in 2013, with 48 million regis-
tered workers (Kuek et al. 2015). Beyond their size,
online labor platforms are worthy of research attention
because of the ease with which research can be con-
ducted (see Horton et al. 2011), but also because they
can serve as a testing ground for new applications of
human andmachine intelligence (e.g., the case of Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk) (Chen and Horton 2016).
Online labor platforms also challenge the role of
geography, matching workers and employers across
borders (Agrawal et al. 2016, Hong and Pavlou 2017,
Gefen and Carmel 2008). This borderless labor source
has implications “not only for what is made where
and by whom, but also [for] the human capital deci-
sions made by individuals, and even the degree of
specialization of workers” (Chen and Horton 2016,
p. 407). Indeed, online labor platforms have the abil-
ity to act as standalone markets, disrupting traditional
labor markets and the organizations that depend on
them. A recent study by Burtch et al. (2018) even
shows that entrepreneursmay choose towork ononline
labor platforms as freelancers rather than try to pur-
sue entrepreneurial projects of relatively low quality.
In that way, there is initial evidence that online labor
platform jobs “may, on average, substitute for lower-
quality entrepreneurial activity rather than act as a
complement to higher-quality entrepreneurial activity”
(Burtch et al. 2018, p. 4). Online labor platforms also
exhibit new forms of leadership, oﬀering a type of face-
less management sometimes referred to as algorithmic
management (Möhlmann and Zalmanson 2017).
The shift from traditional to online labor platforms
can be explained by both the demand- and the supply-
side of the market. New global digital infrastruc-
tures and new legal and regulatory incentives (Befort
2002) have pushed employers to turn to flexible work.
Concurrently responsibility for worker protection and
social costs have shifted back to freelancers creating an
arms-length, or mediated relationship between work-
ers and employers (recent developments with Uber
illustrate the point). Nevertheless, there has been a sig-
nificant increase in demand for this work, especially
toward achieving work-family balance, supplementing
stagnant wages, compensating for unemployment, and
coping with “just-in-time” work (Collier et al. 2017).
The key challenge fromadigital platformperspective
is that platform owners struggle to keep repeat engage-
ments on the system.This is a classicproblem that arises
when the platformpricing extractsmore value from the
interaction than it adds (Rochet and Tirole 2003). In the
case of Uber, drivers earn fares by providing rides on
a flexible basis. Given this flexibility, a central question
is the extent to which the Uber platform can influence
the supply of drivers on their platforms without hurt-
ing demand. Dynamic, or surge pricing, as it is some-
times called, can help establish such a supply/demand
balance by paying attention to labor-supply elasticities,
that is, “the responsiveness of supply hours to changes
in the prevailing price of services” (Chen and Sheldon
2016,p. 2).Determiningexactly“themagnitudeofhigh-
frequency, labor supply elasticities is fundamental to
the economic justification of not just Uber’s dynamic
pricing system, but any firmemploying a dynamic pric-
ing system to incentivize the supply of services” (Chen
and Sheldon 2016, p. 3).
A related challenge is how to price a task when
there are uncertainties. In such situations, there may be
bid-price dispersions on a task, whichmay create value
uncertainties between both freelancers and employers
(Hong et al. 2016). Although there has been substan-
tial research from either the employer’s (e.g., Horton
2017) or the freelancer’s perspective (e.g., Agrawal et al.
2015), there has been very little research assessing both
parties’ choices and the implications for their success-
ful matching on online labor platforms (see Zheng
et al. 2016).
Another challenge that emerges is adverse selec-
tion due to asymmetric information between employ-
ers and freelance workers (Hong et al. 2016). Oppor-
tunistic freelancers may misrepresent or over-report
their eﬀort, leaving employers unable to separate high-
quality contractors from low-quality ones (Lin et al.
2018). Such information uncertainties can be mitigated
by implementing robust reputation systems that serve
as a sanctioning device against freelancers’ misrepre-
sentation of their capabilities (Moreno and Terwiesch
2014). One unintended consequence of reputation sys-
tems, however, is that they create an entry barrier for
qualified freelancers who have not yet established a
reputation (Pallais 2014). A separate mechanism for
addressing information asymmetry is online monitor-
ing of freelancer task-based activities through new dig-
ital technologies (Agrawal et al. 2015). While a signifi-
cant amount of research eﬀort has been placed on the
design, evaluation, and optimization of reputation sys-
tems, few studies have considered the role of online
monitoring and the implications such monitoring may
have for the successfulmatching of employers and free-
lancers on online labor platforms (see Liang et al. 2016).
Despite these challenges, online labor platforms can
achieve some positive outcomes for participants. For
example, some platforms might oﬀer training to help
their aﬃliates tackle more complex work. Companies
such as uTest (testing software), MicroTask (quality
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assurance for data entry), CloudCrowd (proofreading
and translation), and LiveOps (call centers), already
recruit and train workers for their standardized tasks
and set prices for both sides of the market. However,
there is little research examining the eﬀects of training
and development on online labor platforms for work-
ers seeking employment. There are a number of sectors
where this would be highly beneficial, especially for
“new-collar jobs”10 in developing countries.
Further research into online labor markets and the
future of work will need to consider both the employ-
ers, or buyers, as well as the freelancers, or sellers, of
services, while also accounting for the digital capa-
bilities of platforms. Some relevant research questions
include: How does pricing for work done on an online labor
platform impact repeat engagements￿ How do value uncer-
tainties about a task aﬀect employers and freelancers on
online labor platforms￿ How does online monitoring aﬀect
successful matching of employers and freelancers on online
labor platforms￿ What are the training and development
eﬀects of online labor platforms for unemployed workers￿
Implications for Policy
The largest platform firms have multi-trillion U.S. dol-
lar market valuations, and touch the everyday life of
the world’s Internet-connected citizens (Parker et al.
2016). The infrastructures and platforms of these firms
present new challenges related to data ownership,
privacy, the influence of social media on democracy,
disruption of existing business models and of full-
time work, and the swelling concentration of wealth.
Although a comprehensive review of the policy impli-
cations spawned by platforms and infrastructures is
well beyond the scope of this editorial, we will discuss
some of the most straightforward ones. We conclude
with suggestions for research that can inform better
regulation.
Data Ownership
Related to the content and device layers, a battle is
looming over the ownership of data that is gener-
ated by everyday physical devices such as power-
generation equipment, jet turbines, and street lamps.
As an example, the OEM, John Deere, has seen conflict
with farmers over who has rights to access the soft-
ware and data generated by tractors (Naughton 2017).
Once simple farm equipment, tractors have evolved
into sophisticated information-gathering machines—
more like the Mars Rover—that can capture precise
data such as seed and fertilizer inputs, soil compo-
sition, and atmospheric conditions. In a study spon-
sored by the American Soybean Association, farmers
reported a 15% cost reduction from using data-driven
technology; a diﬀerence large enough to impact prof-
its and loss (Johnson 2012). What is important is that,
the data that farmers provide to manufacturers have
applications far beyond improving the basic productiv-
ity of farms. Uses range from powering seasonal labor
markets, to selling insurance, and even informing com-
modities trading decisions (Wolfert et al. 2017).
The metaphor of tractor as data-gathering machine
extends to many other domains, too. For example, city
street lights can serve as hosts for a multitude of sen-
sors, from sound to atmospheric. They can also extend
communications network equipment by taking advan-
tage of pre-existing connections to power, and relative
ease of connection to broadband backhaul to connect
radio equipment to networks. In other settings, ware-
houses that use forklifts and other handling equipment
might become platform nodes to collect data on the
movement of goods through a distribution system.
The question farmers, as well as everyone else, might
reasonably ask is, how much value is being created
from their data, and is there some way they can ben-
efit as well? The amount of value created from tractor
data can be significant. More challenging is how to
share the value created from high quantities of data—
such as traﬃc or pedestrian flow data in cities—or user
data fromwearable devices, or even from location data
from mobile devices and apps such as Google Maps
or Waze, and home assistants such as Amazon Home
and Google Echo. Scholars have grappled with what
frameworks might govern personal data, and Schwartz
(1994) laid out five principles that a market design
would need to cover, as follows:
• Limitations on an individual’s right to alienate per-
sonal information;
• Default rules that force disclosure of the terms of trade;
• A right of exit for participants in the market;
• The establishment of damages to deter market abuses;
• Institutions to police the personal information market
and punish privacy violation
In practice, the principles that Schwartz (1994) laid
out have been diﬃcult to implement primarily because
of regulations, although there are also significant tech-
nical issues to overcome. Spiekermann et al. (2015) note
that in many countries, privacy protection regulations
“leave little room for market negotiations between the
data subject and the data controller, let alone between
third parties.” Koutroumpis et al. (2017) lay out some of
the challenges of implementing data markets and sug-
gest that blockchain technology may provide a way to
create markets with enforceable contracts (for a review,
see Catalini and Gans 2016).
A summary of the U.S. eﬀorts on network policy
can be found on the U.S. Commerce Department’s
website:11 ,12
On November ￿, ￿￿￿￿, the Secretary of Commerce un-
veiled the Department of Commerce’s new Digital Economy
Agenda, which will help businesses and consumers realize
the potential of the digital economy to advance growth and
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opportunity. The Agenda focuses on four key objectives￿ pro-
moting a free and open Internet worldwide￿ promoting trust
online￿ ensuring access for workers, families, and companies￿
and promoting innovation.
Even more directly related to the topic of platforms
and infrastructure is the focus report on the Inter-
net of Things (IoT), which lays out four focus areas:13
Enabling Infrastructure Availability and Access; Craft-
ing Balanced Policy and Building Coalitions; Pro-
moting Standards and Technology Advancement, and
Encouraging Markets. Of particular relevance to IoT
data trading, Koutroumpis et al. (2017) detail a number
of multilateral data trading platform market designs.
In particular, they note the tradeoﬀ between control
and quality on one hand and transaction costs on the
other. A centralized model has a market intermedi-
ary that can keep transaction costs low but might oﬀer
lower quality and control. A decentralized market uses
encryption technologies such as blockchains to provide
a publicly verifiable ownership and source for data.
Privacy Protection and Democracy Concerns
The European Union and the United States have long
had diﬀerent approaches to privacy. Whitman (2004)
argues that the diﬀerence is rooted in cultural norms.
To quote Whitman, “Why is it that French people won’t
talk about their salaries, but will take oﬀ their bikini tops￿
Why is it that Americans comply with court discovery
orders that open essentially all of their documents for inspec-
tion, but refuse to carry identity cards￿” Whitman (2004)
argues that Continental protections are rooted in the
protection of a right to respect and dignity. In contrast,
Americans seek to protect their liberty, especially in
their own homes. This diﬀerence in values has found
its way into policy, especially with respect to data
collection.
The Safe Harbor agreement, replaced in 2016 by
the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework, provided a way
forward for a time.14 However, increasingly, data are
collected and aggregated from across the globe. It
is not always possible for the cloud service firms to
say exactly where a particular piece of data is stored
because there are constant optimizations in the shift
information across the globe to balance the load on the
various infrastructure services. The challenge comes
when one authority tries to claim jurisdiction. For
example, in a recent case before the U.S. Supreme
Court, Microsoft argued that it could not produce
e-mail evidence in a drug traﬃcking investigation
because the data in question was stored in Ireland
instead of the U.S. (Matsakis 2018). Microsoft’s position
was that U.S. authorities should work through Irish
authorities to gain access. The U.S. Justice Department
argued that the search warrant is valid because it could
take action in the U.S. to produce the evidence. As it
turns out, the U.S. omnibus budget bill signed into law
in March 2018 settled the case by statute.15 , 16
More generally, the EU has taken the lead in the
area of consumer protection as it prepares to imple-
ment the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
in May 2018 (Blackmer 2016). The regulation includes
the following features.
• Expanded scope: GDPR regulation includes “pro-
cessors” and “controllers” of data; institutions must
own their compliance aswell as third-party companies.
• Significant fines: non-compliance can incur a fine
of either 4% of a company’s annual global revenue or
e120 million, whichever is greater.
• Increased consumer rights: GDPR has expanded
the scope of rights for data subjects, including data
portability and access.
• Data breach reporting: notification of a data
breach is now required within 72 hours.
• Data protection oﬃcers: institutions may be
required to appoint data protection oﬃcers to monitor
compliance with GDPR regulation.
The case for such regulation and the challenge of
controlling data use after collection has played out in
a very public way, as Cambridge Analytica’s use of
Facebook data has dramatically shown (Seetharaman
and Bindley 2018). Although social media systems can
control who has initial access to their users’ data, it is
much more diﬃcult to audit use after the fact, since
data can be combined from multiple sources making it
diﬃcult to trace the exact origin without having inter-
nal access to data sources. As a result, locking down
data access at this point is somewhat like “closing the
barn door after the horses have left.” If the data that
was released improperly ages quickly, then new pri-
vacy policies can have a significant impact. However, if
the released data is more permanent, such as the list of
“friends” in a social network, then improper releases
will have a longer-term impact. The GDPR’s aﬃrma-
tion of a “right to be forgotten” stands in direct contrast
to this potential longer term impact.
The challenge for both platform operators and gov-
ernment representatives charged with protecting citi-
zens’ interests is to balance what people say they want,
against what their actions imply about their prefer-
ences. The idea of a property interest in personal data
can help users better understand the value of what
they are giving away versus the goods and services
that systems provide. The EU’s proposed tax on pure
data platforms, such as Google search, suggests that
regulators are exploring such structures.17
In addition to issues of data ownership and pri-
vacy protection, there are increasing concerns about
the impact of social media platforms on democracy.
The Russian attempts to interfere with and influence
the 2016 U.S. presidential election using social media
has been well-documented. Less well-known is that at
least 17 countries experienced election manipulation
in the following year as a report documenting election
Do
wn
loa
de
d f
rom
 in
for
ms
.or
g b
y [
17
8.1
08
.13
3.1
18
] o
n 1
8 J
un
e 2
01
8, 
at 
13
:47
 . F
or 
pe
rso
na
l u
se 
on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Constantinides, Henfridsson, and Parker: Digital Infrastructure and Platforms
Information Systems Research, 2018, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 381–400, ©2018 The Author(s) 395
influence showed in November 2017 (Kelly et al. 2017).
Despite the eﬀorts of Russia to influence elections in
other countries, the authors note that the majority of
interference was deployed by incumbent governments
to suppress democracy within their own countries.
A recent study of social media and “fake news”
using a detailed database supplied by Twitter showed
that false information spreads significantly farther and
faster than fact-based news (Vosoughi et al. 2018). One
possible reason given for this finding is that false news
can be more novel, and thus generate more interest,
even if it is untrue. The broader issue is that social
media systems are subject to “information cascades”
that can cause information to spread quickly, whether
accurate or not. This phenomenon might be partially
explained by the rapid deployment of machine learn-
ing algorithms that can quickly sift throughmountains
of data to identify patterns (Athey 2018).
A solution might be to put intentional brakes into
social media systems to slow the copying of mes-
sages. But such brakes run counter to the goal of algo-
rithms that reinforce consumer preferences by deliver-
ing “more of the same”when they demonstrate interest
in a topic. Braking cascades might be possible through
self-governance, but if that fails, then some kind of
government regulation might be necessary. A major
challenge, however, would be making regulation com-
patible with the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment.
Net Neutrality
On December 15, 2017, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) voted to scrap net neutrality
regulations that previously prohibited broadband
providers from blocking websites or charging for
higher-quality service or certain content. The U.S. fed-
eral government will also no longer regulate high-
speed Internet delivery as if it were a utility. The vote
reverses the FCC’s 2015 decision during the Obama
administration, to have stronger oversight over broad-
band providers.
There are arguments for and against net neutral-
ity. On one hand, the Internet Association, the trade
group that represents big tech firms such as Google
and Facebook, are for net neutrality because, as they
argue, the Internet was built as a public good, free
for all to use, without restrictions. According to the
“best-eﬀort principle,” each data packet is transmit-
ted in a content-blind manner without any discrimi-
nation (“a bit is a bit is a bit,” Faulhaber 2011, p. 18).
On the other hand, however, Internet Service Providers
(ISP) like AT&T and Comcast argue that, given that
some 70% of Internet traﬃc during peak hours comes
from digital platforms like Netflix and YouTube, they
need to charge fees for the growing traﬃc to be able to
maintain and improve the digital infrastructure. They
argue that, if control points are not implemented, we
will end up with some powerful platforms free-riding
and crowding-out competition from smaller platforms.
This may also lead to a dying digital infrastructure—at
least for poor, remote areas—as we have seen in the
case of transportation and electricity infrastructures
(Graham and Marvin 2001).
New platforms and infrastructures in the digital age
are built on a layered modular architecture, which, as
we have discussed so far, has far-reaching implications
on net-neutrality and its prevailing principles. Data
now flow between devices and service applications, as
we discussed above, that exceed pure capacity needs.
This imposes new requirements regarding the quality,
reliability, and eﬃciency of the data transfer, and gives
rise to new questions regarding net neutrality, beyond
ISP (Statovci-Halimi and Franzl 2013). For example,
some have called for “device neutrality” (Krämer et al.
2013) to argue that neither device manufacturers nor
software developers (e.g., Apple iOS, Google Android)
should have influence on what content or which ser-
vices can be accessed by the devices (e.g., Apple does
not support Flash on its iOS devices). Thus, there is a
call for new regulation on net neutrality, one that takes
into account the increasing digital convergence of plat-
forms and infrastructures (see Sedlmeir et al. 2017).
Industry Level Challenges
Beyond the above challenges observed at the four lay-
ers of the layered modular architecture, there are also
disruptive challenges at the industry level. Disruption
has been observed in media, lodging, transportation,
and more. The concern is especially keen when plat-
forms have ignored existing regulatory frameworks, as
in the cases of Airbnb and Uber. Entrants claim that
incumbents have engaged in regulatory capture, while
incumbents argue that everyone needs to play by the
same rules (Edelman 2015, Parker et al. 2016). One
conceptual framework might come from the impact
that globalization had on manufacturing industries in
OECD countries in the 1990s and 2000s. Autor (2015)
demonstrated that globalization had an unambigu-
ously negative impact on the specific industries and
towns where the associated infrastructure was located.
At the same time, the broader benefits of global trade
have also been demonstrated. The challenge is how to
deal with and potentially alleviate the major conse-
quences that small groups experience, while still allow-
ing for the broader benefits.
The challenge that regulators face as they try to
craft a response to disruption is to avoid capture by
the incumbent firms that would prefer to use gov-
ernment authority to avoid competition. The upcom-
ing implementation of Payment Services Directive 2
(PSD2) highlights some of the contradictions of using
regulation in quickly changing industries. The goals of
PSD2 are as follows (European Commission 2018).
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• Contribute to a more integrated and eﬃcient European
payments market
• Improve the level playing field for payment service
providers (including new players)
• Make payments safer and more secure
• Protect consumers
The implementation of PSD2 requires financial insti-
tutions to provide API access to customer accounts.
The goal is to facilitate the entry of entrepreneurial
“fintech” firms to innovate and provide new solutions
such as robotic portfolio advisory services and sin-
gle portal access to accounts held in multiple institu-
tions. This goal can be partly viewed in the context
of EU concern about the relative lack of “tech” start-
ups, described as “Platform Anxiety” by Evans and
Gawer (2016). The concern that incumbent financial
services firms express is that, although the goal is to
facilitate entrepreneurship, the practical impact might
be to create openings for the incumbent technology
firms (Amazon, Google, etc.) to enter financial services
markets with the possible unintended consequence of
crowding out start-ups.18 Regulators are likely to view
such concerns with scepticism given the obvious inter-
ests incumbents have in protecting their markets.
Another industry level challenge is the potential for
anti-competitive behavior by platform firms that enjoy
large market shares protected by network eﬀects and
switching costs (Eisenmann et al. 2006, 2011). Search
markets, for example, have drawn scrutiny from both
EU and U.S. regulators. The concern in search is that
results will be manipulated to favor platform partners.
On the other hand, markets that are linked by net-
work eﬀects often have unique prices where certain
user segments can see prices at or belowmarginal cost.
Although this might look like predatory pricing, in
reality, the firms involved are often engaging in optimal
price setting behavior. Evans (2013) argues that legal
briefs that do not cite and incorporate the two-sided
network literature be subject to Daubert motions of
dismissal. Nonetheless, as large technology and social
media platforms continue to grow, the possibility for
abuse grows as well and will need a vigilant set of reg-
ulators to ensure a level playing field.
Recommendations
There are a number of fruitful avenues for further re-
search to support the resolution of the regulatory issues
described above. These include but are not limited to
the following.
• Clarify intellectual property rights to establish
ownership. Potentially secure those rights using tech-
nologies such as blockchains.
• Foster the debate to balance the goals of privacy
against the desire for economic growth.
• Examine whether social media should be viewed
as “critical infrastructure” given their ability to influ-
ence critical societal functions such as elections. If so,
what are the appropriate regulatory regimes?
• Examine an appropriate role for government
intervention into how platforms operate. Specifically,
is there a role for a “platform tax” to help ease the
transition of disrupted workers into new industries?
• Assess whether platforms can regulate them-
selves. Is the threat of negative publicity and lost
users enough of an enforcement mechanism or is
government regulation inevitable? Platform owners
need to invest in research to better understand their
broader impact. How might social media platforms
make design changes that might reduce/prevent infor-
mation cascades?
Conclusion and Acknowledgments
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Endnotes
1However, most of Apple’s revenue and profit is, admittedly, real-
ized through product sales.
2The Scalable Product Architecture serves as a platform for the latest
generations of Volvo’s XC60, XC90, and S/V90 models.
3Yoo et al. (2010) refer to this as the separation between network and
content (p. 726).
4Modularity refers to the degree to which a product can be decom-
posed into components that can be recombined (Schilling 2000).
A modular architecture oﬀers an eﬀective way to reduce complex-
ity and to increase flexibility by decomposing a product design into
loosely coupled components interconnected through prespecified
interfaces (Baldwin and Clark 2000).
5Baldwin and Clark (2000) refers to design rules as a way to prevent
cycling in the design of interdependent objects.
6See http://uk.businessinsider.com/r-amazon-to-spend-149-bln-on
-air-cargo-hub-fans-talk-of-bigger-ambitions-2017-2?r =US&IR=T.
7See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-blockchain/bp
-shell-lead-plan-for-blockchain-based-platform-for-energy-trading
-idUSKBN1D612I.
8See https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/01/16/ibm
-forges-global-joint-venture-with-maersk-applying-blockchain-to
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